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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3572 
_____________ 
 
MARK IV TRANSPORTATION & LOGISTICS, 
                                                                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LIGHTNING LOGISTICS, INC.; TRAVELLER LOGISTICS, INC.;  
JOHN GREGORY O'RIORDAN; CROSSTOWN COURIER, INC.; 
SCOTT EVATT* 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-09-cv-06480) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 27, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 25, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* Mark IV Transportation & Logistics is a New Jersey corporation whose correct 
name is “Mark IV Transportation & Logistics, Inc.”  Lightning Logistics was a 
Tennessee limited liability company whose correct name is “Lightning Logistics, LLC.” 
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___________ 
 
OPINION** 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal arises out of the failure of the now-defunct Lightning Logistics, LLC 
(“Lightning”) to pay for delivery services rendered by Appellant Mark IV Transportation 
& Logistics, Inc. (“Mark IV”).  The issue presented by Mark IV is whether grounds exist 
to pierce Lightning’s corporate veil and impose alter ego liability to establish personal 
jurisdiction over defendants who are residents of Tennessee.  Those defendants are 
Appellees: Scott Evatt, former President of Lightning; John Gregory O’Riordan, a former 
owner of Lightning; and Crosstown Courier, Inc. (“Crosstown”), Evatt’s current 
company.   
 The District Court held that Lightning was not a “sham or dummy” entity such 
that its corporate veil should be pierced and alter ego liability imposed.  Mark IV Transp. 
& Logistics, Inc. v. Lightning Logistics, LLC, 2014 WL 7073088, *7 (D. N.J. Dec. 15, 
2014).  The District Court then granted Evatt and Crosstown’s motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction.  The District Court also, after requesting a supplemental letter 
brief and holding a hearing on the matter, dismissed the claims against O’Riordan for 
lack of personal jurisdiction.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the orders of the 
District Court.  
                                              
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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I. 
 Mark IV is a New Jersey corporation that provides delivery services.  Lightning 
was a Tennessee LLC that provided logistical services to commercial shippers, including 
arranging for delivery of packages by companies like Mark IV.  Lightning was owned 
and operated by Evatt and O’Riordan, both of whom are Tennessee residents.  Evatt 
currently owns and operates Crosstown, another Tennessee corporation that provides 
courier services.  In 2008, Mark IV agreed to provide “last mile” delivery services in 
New Jersey for Lightning.1  Mark IV continued to provide delivery services for Lightning 
until August of 2009.  At that time, Mark IV was owed approximately $100,000 under its 
agreement with Lightning.   
 In December of 2009, Mark IV commenced this action against only Lightning.  In 
April of 2010, Lightning was administratively dissolved by the State of Tennessee.   In 
February of 2011, Mark IV filed an amended complaint, adding as defendants Evatt, 
O’Riordan, Crosstown, and Traveller Logistics, Inc. (“Traveller”), the successor 
corporation to Lightning.  The District Court entered default judgment against Lightning 
and then default judgment against Traveller as Lightning’s successor-in-interest.  
Traveller itself was later dissolved.  Mark IV then sought to impose personal liability on 
Evatt, O’Riordan, and Crosstown as alter egos of Lightning.   
                                              
 1 “Last mile” delivery services consists of delivering packages over the final leg of 
a shipment, such as from an airport or handling facility to the package’s ultimate 
recipient.   
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 After permitting discovery, the District Court determined that Mark IV had failed 
to present evidence sufficient to warrant piercing the corporate veil of Lightning.  
Because personal jurisdiction could be asserted over Evatt, O’Riordan, and Crosstown 
only if the liability of Lightning could be imputed to them, the District Court dismissed 
those parties for lack of personal jurisdiction.2  Mark IV filed this timely appeal.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and our 
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.  D’Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff 
v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 101 (3d Cir. 2009).   
III. 
 Under the New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act, “[t]he law of the state or 
other jurisdiction under which a foreign limited liability company is formed governs . . . 
the liability of a member as member and a manager as manager for the debts, obligations, 
or other liabilities of the company.”  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-57(a)(2). Accordingly, as Lightning 
was a Tennessee LLC, Tennessee law governs Mark IV’s alter ego theory of liability.  
Generally, under Tennessee law, members, owners, employees, or other agents of an 
LLC have no personal liability for the debts or obligations of the company.  See Tenn. 
                                              
 2 O’Riordan appeared pro se before the District Court and filed an answer to Mark 
IV’s Amended Complaint.  Although O’Riordan was named as a defendant in the Second 
Amended Complaint, he filed no answer or any other response.  Mark IV then moved for 
default judgment against O’Riordan.  The District Court denied this motion, however, 
and sua sponte dismissed the claims against O’Riordan.   
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Code Ann. §§ 48-217-101(a)(l), 48-249-14(a)(l)(B).  “To pierce the corporate veil,” and 
impose liability on a member or parent company, “a court must be convinced that the 
separate corporate entity ‘is a sham or a dummy’ or that disregarding the separate 
corporate entity is ‘necessary to accomplish justice.’”  CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Trost, 333 
S.W.3d 73, 88 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Oceanics Sch., Inc. v. Barbour, 112 S.W.3d 135, 
140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).   
 Because “there is a presumption of corporate regularity,” Tennessee courts have 
warned that “[t]he principle of piercing the corporate veil [should] be applied with great 
caution and not precipitately.”  Muroll Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Tenn. Tape, Inc., 908 
S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).  A number of factors are to be assessed in 
determining whether the corporate veil should be pierced, including:  
(1) whether there was a failure to collect paid in capital; (2) whether the 
corporation was grossly undercapitalized; (3) the nonissuance of stock 
certificates; (4) the sole ownership of stock by one individual; (5) the use of 
the same office or business location; (6) the employment of the same 
employees or attorneys; (7) the use of the corporation as an instrumentality 
or business conduit for an individual or another corporation; (8) the diversion 
of corporate assets by or to a stockholder or other entity to the detriment of 
creditors, or the manipulation of assets and liabilities in another; (9) the use 
of the corporation as a subterfuge in illegal transactions; (10) the formation 
and use of the corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of another 
person or entity; and (11) the failure to maintain arms length relationships 
among related entities. 
 
Pamperin v. Streamline Mfg., Inc., 276 S.W.3d 428, 438 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Allen, 584 F. Supp. 386, 397 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)).  No one 
factor is conclusive in this analysis, but it is necessary “that the equities substantially 
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favor the party requesting the court to disregard the corporate status.”  Trost, 333 S.W.3d 
at 89 (citing Barbour, 112 S.W.3d at 140–41).   
 Mark IV argues that the failure of Evatt and O’Riordan to adhere to corporate 
formalities in operating Lightning and Evatt’s alleged misuse of Lightning’s corporate 
funds compel the piercing of its corporate veil.  According to Mark IV, Evatt withdrew 
$160,000 from Lightning’s line of credit.  This withdrawal left Lightning unable to pay 
Mark IV for the services it rendered pursuant to the contract.  Mark IV also notes that 
Lightning leased its office space from Crosstown and, on occasion, shared employees 
with the company.  We agree with the District Court, however, that, although Lightning 
did operate informally and Evatt did draw on Lightning’s line of credit, the equities do 
not weigh so substantially in Mark IV’s favor that Lightning’s corporate status should be 
disregarded.  Trost, 333 S.W.3d at 89. 
 First, with regard to Lighting’s informal structure, Tennessee does not require 
LLCs to adhere to corporate formalities to maintain their limited liability status.  See 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-217-101(e) (“The failure of an LLC to observe the usual company 
formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its LLC powers or management of 
its business is not a ground for imposing personal liability on the members, governors, 
managers, employees or other agents of the LLC.”); NVK Spinning Co., LTD. v. Nichols, 
2014 WL 28831, *6 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 2, 2014) (“Adherence to corporate formalities is 
not required for an LLC to maintain its limited-liability status under the statute.”).  Courts 
may consider a failure to adhere to corporate formalities in their veil-piercing analyses, 
but in the absence of other factors, such a failure does not make a business a “sham or 
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dummy.”  Trost, 333 S.W.3d at 88.  As President of Lightning, Evatt had broad authority 
to make decisions affecting the business.  Misguided decisions typically do not warrant 
piercing the corporate veil.   
 Evatt’s withdrawal of funds does not require a different result.  Courts may pierce 
the corporate veil “when the corporation is liable for a debt but is without funds to pay 
the debt, and the lack of funds is due to some misconduct on the part of the officers and 
directors.”  In re Steffner, 479 B.R. 746, 755–56 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2012) (quoting VP 
Bldgs., Inc. v. Polygon Grp., No. M2001–00613–COA–R3–CV, 2002 WL 15634, *4 
(Tenn. App. Jan. 8, 2002).   Evatt used Lighting’s line of credit to secure a loan for 
Crosstown, but, as the District Court noted, nothing in the record suggests that the line of 
credit was designated exclusively for paying creditors.  In Steffner, the owner of a single 
member LLC transferred funds from the company to another entity he owned just one 
day before a garnishment was served on the LLC.  Steffner, 479 B.R. at 753.  The 
Bankruptcy Court declined to pierce the LLC’s corporate veil as there was “no evidence . 
. . that the transfer resulted in a permanent inability for [the LLC] to meet its financial 
obligations.”  Id. at 757.  Here, as in Steffner, the withdrawal did not rise to the level of 
misconduct necessary for disregarding corporate status.  Id. at 757.    
 The same is true of the sharing of resources and personnel.   In Steffner, the 
Bankruptcy Court declined to pierce the LLC’s corporate veil despite the fact that the two 
companies “operated out of the same building . . . and used the same bank, attorneys, and 
accounts.”  Id.  As was the case in Steffner, Lightning and Crosstown were “formed at 
different times and for different purposes” such that Lightning could not be considered a 
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“sham or dummy” even if it did rent office space from Crosstown.3  Id. at 757, 756.  
Because the facts do not support piercing Lightning’s corporate veil or the imposition of 
alter ego liability, the District Court properly dismissed the claims against Evatt and 
Crosstown for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
 Mark IV also argues that the District Court erred in sua sponte dismissing the 
claims against O’Riordan.   Mark IV correctly notes that O’Riordan did not raise the 
issue of personal jurisdiction and that he filed an answer to Mark IV’s Amended 
Complaint.  O’Riordan, who was not represented by counsel during the District Court 
proceedings,4 also filed a “Preliminary Statement” regarding Mark IV’s motion for 
default judgment, but never submitted an answer or any other response to the Second 
Amended Complaint.  After a hearing on the issue, the District Court dismissed the 
claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that O’Riordan “never answered the 
Second Amended Complaint, or sought an extension of time to do so, or filed any other 
application or pleading in [the] matter.”  (App. 8.)   
 “[W]hen a court is considering whether to enter a default judgment, it may dismiss 
an action sua sponte for lack of personal jurisdiction.”  In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th 
Cir. 1999); accord Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 
767, 771 (10th Cir. 1997); D'Onofrio v. Il Mattino, 430 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (E.D. Pa. 
2006); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bramlett, 2010 WL 2696459, *1 (D. N.J. 
                                              
 3 Crosstown was formed approximately 10 years before Lightning was established.  
Moreover, unlike Lightning, Crosstown’s principal business was in “last mile” delivery 
services.   
 4 O’Riordan has not participated in this appeal, either through counsel or pro se.  
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July 6, 2010) (“Before entering default judgment, the Court must address the threshold 
issue of whether it has personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction over the 
parties.”).  As explained in Allaham v. Naddaf, 2015 WL 3421464, *3 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 
2015): 
[I]n contrast to the general rule that personal jurisdiction is waivable, a court 
considering a motion for a default judgment must sua sponte ensure that an 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over each defaulting defendant is proper.  
Compare Jasper v. Bexar Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr., 332 F. App'x 718, 719 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (noting the general rule that “because personal jurisdiction may 
be conferred by consent of the parties . . . a court may not sua sponte dismiss 
for want of personal jurisdiction”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted), with AnnexTelecom Co. v. Brown, 2014 WL 5149101, *1 (E.D.Pa. 
Oct. 14, 2014) (asserting that “the [c]ourt may only grant a motion for default 
judgment if it has ... personal jurisdiction over the parties against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought”) (citation omitted), and Pars 
Tekstil Sanayi Tic, A.S. v. Dynasty Designs, Inc., 2008 WL 3559607, *1 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2008) (confirming that “[a] district court may not enter a 
default judgment unless it is satisfied that it has personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant”) (citation omitted).  “In reviewing its personal jurisdiction, the 
court does not assert a personal defense of the parties; rather, the court 
exercises its responsibility to determine that it has the power to enter the 
default judgment.”  Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th 
Cir. 1986). 
 
Because the District Court sua sponte addressed the lack of personal jurisdiction in the 
context of a motion for default judgment, dismissal of O’Riordan was proper.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the December 15, 2014 and August 10, 
2016 Orders of the District Court.  
